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NOTE AND COMMENT
ZONING AND THE CONSTITUTION
Times of political and economic transition sometimes neces-
sitate change in the supreme law of the state. The Constitution
of Missouri for 1875 provided for a convention to make needed
revisions of the state constitution., In anticipation of the pro-
posed submission to the electorate of the question concerning
such a convention and in further anticipation of an affirmative
majority, it becomes apparent that subjects of state-wide inter-
est should be considered with constitutional changes in view.
The rapidly advancing scope of zoning is among those subjects
which may well demand attention.
It has been said that "The idea [for zoning] came from one
of the most progressive German cities of that day, Frankfort-on-
the-Main, where the general principle of controlling the use of
private property has been put into operation, with conspicuously
advantageous results, under the leadership of Burgomaster
Adickes."2 This idea spread and became firmly entrenched in
this country for the first time in New York.3 Since that time,
zoning practices have passed through times of uncertainty and
change, 4but in ever increasing extent and favor5 such ordinances
have been enacted covering city property, and with the enactment
of the California Planning Act of 1927,6 together with further
extension in the Wisconsin County Zoning Act,7 zoning entered
a new era of expansion.
In zoning's era of uncertainty, the history of zoning legisla-
tion in the state of Missouri had an interesting development. In
Missouri the first zoning ordinances were passed by St. Louis 8
1. Article XV, section 4 provides for the submission of the question,
"Shall there be a convention to revise and amend the Constitution?"
2. Munro, A Danger Spot in the Zoning Movement (May 1931) 155-
Part II The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
128, 133.
8. Metzenbaum, The Law of Zoning (1930) 150. New York was also the
locale of the first decisions upon comprehensive zoning. Lincoln Trust Co. v.
Williams Bldg. Corp. (1920) 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209, holding the
zoning resolutions were not such encumbrances as would be a defense to a
specific performance action against the proposed purchaser, since it was a
proper exercise of the police power.
4. Bassett, Zoning (1936) 15-16.
5. 8 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, Problems
Relating to Executive, Administration and Powers (1938) 327.
6. Cal. Stats. (1929) c. 838; Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1937) act 5211b
provides the machinery for county planning and requires all counties to
use it.
7. Wis. Stats. (1937) c. 59.97, §1.
8. Wells, The Law of Zoning in Missouri (1926) 34 Law Ser. Mo. Bull.
1, 8.
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operating under a home-rule charter. In the case of State ex
rel. Penrose Inv. Co. v. McKelvey,9 the Missouri Supreme Court
held the St. Louis zoning ordinance unconstitutional. The court
took the strict view of the police power in holding the attempt
to zone in the absence of an enabling act was unconstitutional
under the Missouri Constitution of 1875.10 The decision is, there-
fore, not to be regarded as hostile to zoning; rather, it holds that
the charter provisions were not broad enough to sustain a com-
prehensive zoning ordinance of this type." This case was fol-
lowed in rapid succession by two other cases holding similarly,
and based upon the same reasoning. 2 To remedy the chaotic
condition which followed these cases,' 3 an enabling act to author-
ize zoning was passed in Missouri, April 4, 1925. 4 In 1926, in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,", the United States Su-
preme Court was called to rule upon the validity of a compre-
hensive zoning ordinance, similar in scope to that held invalid
by the Missouri Supreme Court, and held it to be a valid appli-
cation of the police power, constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although this decision has been criticized by some,10
it has often been favorably cited in succeeding cases.' 7 When the
question of comprehensive zoning again confronted the Missouri
Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v.
Christopher,8 that body reversed its former position. Yet after
the first cases,:9 no one of the judges was called on to change his
9. (1923) 301 Mo. 1, 256 S. W. 474. This case was an original pro-
ceeding in the Supreme Court of Missouri brought to require the Building
Commission of the City of St. Louis to issue to the relators a permit for
the erection of an ice manufactory. The commission refused to issue be-
cause of St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance No. 30199 (July 1918). This ordinance
was passed under the powers given by art. I, City Charter 1914, p. 540.
10. Mo. Const. (1875) art. II, §21. "Private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compensation. * * * "
11. Baker, Legal Aspects of Zoning (1927) 128; Bassett, Zoning (1936)
15; Metzenbaum, The Law of Zoning (1930) 201; Bettmann, Constitution-
ality of Zoning (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 834.
12. State ex rel. Better Built Home Co. v. McKelvey (1923) 301 Mo.
130, 256 S. W. 495; St. Louis v. Evraiff (1923) 301 Mo. 231, 256 S. W. 489.
13. Bartholomew, Present Status of Zoning in Missouri (1924) 13 Nat'l
Municipal Rev. 672.
14. Mo. Laws of 1925, 308 to 313; R. S. Mo. (1939) §§7412 to 7423.
15. (1926) 272 U. S. 365.
16. Baker, Legal Aspects of Zoning (1927) 144.
17. Gorieb v. Fox (1927) 274 U. S. 603, 273 U. S. 687; Nectow v. City of
Cambridge (1928) 277 U. S. 183; American Wood Products Co. v. City of
Minneapolis (C. C. A. 8, 1929) 35 F. (2d) 657; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Sprague (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 499.
18. (1927) 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S. W. 720.
19. State ex rel. Penrose Inv. Co. v. McKelvey (1923) 301 Mo. 1, 256
S. W. 474; State ex rel. Better Built Homes Co. v. McKelvey (1923) 301




opinion, because the retiring members had composed the original
case's majority, and the new members joined with the minority
judges.20 That the court remained reluctant to recognize the
validity of zoning is evidenced by the case of Aufderheide V.
Polar Wave Ice and Fuel Co.2'1 where the court when asked to
give a perpetual injunction against an anticipated nuisance from
the operation of an ice factory held that since the zoning ordi-
nance covering the property had been held unconstitutional,
"therefore, [it] became a rule of property, and so the rule of
stare decisis applies, at least so far as the use of the lot now
in controversy, as affected by that zoning ordinance is con-
cerned." However, it must be recognized that the legality of
zoning in Missouri is firmly established.22
While this tergiversation was taking place in Missouri, other
very important advancements in zoning were occurring in widely
separated states, 23 especially California and Wisconsin. Califor-
nia's Constitution of 187924 first made the zoning of "any county,
city, town, or township" possible, and the first ordinance enacted
pursuant to the constitutional provision was passed in Los An-
geles County in 1925.25 Wisconsin in 1923 passed the first en-
abling act permitting counties to zone the land outside the incor-
porated villages and cities. 26 The act was later revised and
20. In State ex rel. Penrose Inv. Co. v. McKelvey (1923) 301 Mo. 1, 256
S. W. 474 the opinion *as written by Walker, Woodson and D. E. Blair
concurring therein, and Graves concurred in the result in a separate opin-
ion. White dissented with Ragland and J. T. Blair concurring. J. T. Blair
and Woodson retired, and were replaced by Atwood and Gantt Then in
State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher (1927) 317 Mo. 1179, 298
S. W. 720, in which the court upheld the constitutionality of a zoning ordi-
nance, the opinion was written by Ragland, and concurred in by Atwood,
Gantt, and White. Graves dissents in a separate opinion, with D. E. Blair
concurring in his results. Walker dissents.
21. (1928) 319 Mo. 337, 4 S. W. (2d) 776.
22. Metzenbaum, The Law of Zoning (1930) 203.
23. Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering 1937) §5211b, Stats. (1937) c. 665; Colo.
Seas. Laws (1939) c. 67; Fla. Laws (1937) c. 17833; Ga. Laws (1937-38)
pt. II, tit. II, p. 767 (Chatham, Bryan, and Liberty Counties), p. 823
(Glynn County); Ill. Rev. Stats. (1939) c. 34, §152i; Ind. Acts (1936)
c. 239; Kan. Laws (1939) c. 164; Ky. Carroll's Stats. (1930) §3239f-1;
Mich. Mason's Comp. Laws (1935 supp.) c. 54, §2642; R. S. Mo. (1939)
§7412; Minn. Sess. Laws (1939) c. 187 (towns), c. 340 (counties); N. Y.
Consolidated Laws (Thompson's 1939) c. 62, art. 16; Penn. Laws (1937)
act 435; Tenn. Pub. Acts (1935) c. 43 (counties), Pub. Acts (1939) c. 158
(unincorporated communities); Va. Acts (1938) c. 415; Wash. Sess. Laws
(1935) c. 44; Wis. Stats. (1937) c. 59.97.
24. Art. XI, §11: "Any county, city, town, or township may make and
enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regula-
tions as are not in conflict with general laws."
25. Los Angeles County Ord. No. 1270 N. S. adopted in April 1925.
26. Wis. Laws of 1923. c. 388, Wis. Stats. (1937) c. 59-97, §1.
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strengthened in 1935, among other things, to make more specific
the section in regard to cooperation between the county boards
and the town boards of the towns in which the lands are located.2 T
Missouri, in due time, following this trend, took its first step
toward zoning extension with the passage of an act creating a
State Planning Board 28 to "make and adopt plans for the purpose
of bringing about coordinated development of the state in ac-
cordance with the present and future economic and social needs
* * * in a manner which will conserve the natural resources of
the state and which will best advance the health, convenience,
prosperity and welfare of the people * * **,,2o But this act,
though an advance, still lacked means of enforcement. The legis-
lature therefore created a County Planning Commission.0 con-
sisting of a county court judge, the county highway engineer, the
chairman of each municipal planning body in the county and one
resident free-holder appointed by the county court of each unin-
corporated part of each township in the county.3" This commis-
sion was to adopt a master plan "to conserve the natural re-
sources of the county to insure efficient expenditure of public
funds and to promote the health, safety, convenience, prosperity
and general welfare of the inhabitants. ' 32 It further provided
that after the adoption of the master plan "no improvement of
a type embraced within the recommendations of the master plan
shall be constructed or authorized without first submitting the
proposed plans thereof to the planning commission and receiving
their written approval and recommendations *.**33 Violation
is made punishable as a misdemeanor.3 4
The Missouri statutory provisions, though making great strides
toward unified state-wide planning and zoning, are too narrowly
limited, for only counties having "a population of not less than
two hundred thousand (200,000) nor more than four hundred
thousand (400,000) inhabitants" are authorized to prepare and
carry out a county planA' It is well recognized that population
is a justifiable basis of classification,"8 but even courts have ex-
27. Wis. Laws of 1935, e. 303. Wehrwein, County Zoning and Consoli-
dation (1935) 11 Wis. L. Rev. 136.
28. Mo. Laws of 1935, 393, R. S. Mo. (1939) §15391.
29. Mo. Laws of 1935, §394, §2; R. S. Mo. (1939) §15392.
30. Mo. Laws of 1939, 622 et seq., R. S. Mo. (1939) §§15348 to 15362.
31. R. S. Mo. (1939) §15349.
32. R. S. Mo. (1939) §15351.
33. R. S. Mo. (1939) §15352.
34. R. S. Mo. (1939) §15363.
35. I. S. Mo. (1939) §15348.
36. State v. Wilson (1915) 265 Mo. 1, 175 S. W. 603; Randolph v. City
of Springfield (1923) 302 Mo. 33, 257 S. W. 449, 31 A. L. R. 612.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss3/13
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pressed the necessity for a comprehensive plan37 to avoid piece-
meal zoning which might very well increase confusion and hinder,
rather than help, development.3 8 Cooperation between county and
city is effectuated by a provision that the chairmen of municipal
planning bodies are members of the county planning board.39
Such cooperation is not effectuated, however, between the county-
city agencies and the state. The existing enactments make no
provision for the submission of plans by the county agency to a
central (state) agency where conflicts may be reconciled and a
central philosophy of state planning be maintained.4 0 There is
much which could be said for such an over-all plan. Under pres-
ent constitutional provisions, however, such a central agency
probably could not enforce a comprehensive plan, since consti-
tutional obstacles4' might be encountered if such central agency
were given a veto power over the programs of constituted de-
partments.
Heretofore, most of the emphasis in the field of zoning has
been on urban problems, but the rapid growth of zoning by
the cities led to the locating of many uses of land prohibited by
city zoning in the unincorporated fringes of the cities.4 3 Though
county zoning rests upon the same principles as urban, yet it
has a greater breadth and depth. It has been termed "economic
geography moulded by a concept of a social purpose," because
it must include the conservation and interrelation of mineral,
forest and water resources, soils, climate, topography and ecology
on the one hand and the social, economic and administrative sys-
tems on the other. 4 Some doubt has been expressed as to zoning
being the correct tool to meet the problems facing suburban or
rural communities 45 and as to the constitutionality under the
police powers of such drastic limitations in the public interest
37. See City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co. (1925) 112 Ohio
State 654, 148 N. E. 842.
38. Chamberlain, Zoning Progress (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 535.
39. R. S. Mo. (1939) §15349.
40. 8 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, Problems
Relating to Executive, Administration and Powers (1938) 330; 4 New York
State Constitutional Convention Committee, State and Local Government
in New Yorkc (1938) 356.
41. Mo. Const. (1875) art. VI, §36. See State ex rel. Buckner v. Mc-
Elroy (1925) 309 Mo. 595, 274 S. W. 749.
43. 4 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, State and
Local Government in New York (1938) 355.
44. Pomeroy, County Zoning under the California Planning Act (May
1931) 155--Part II The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 47, 48.
45. 8 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, Problems
Relating to Executive, Administration and Powers (1938) 329.
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without provisions by direct constitutional expression. 0 How-
ever, it must be borne in mind that zoning legislation, as based
upon the police power,47 a power inherent in the states unless
limited by constitutional provisions,48 is a power which can be
delegated by statute or charter.9 It must be noted, also, how
broadly the scope of the police power has been expanded in recent
years. While the police power at one time justified restrictions of
the use of property or of liberty only to protect the health, safety
or morals of the community, the courts have lately approved exer-
cise of the police power to promote "the general welfare,"0
"public convenience" 51 or "general prosperity."52 In recent years
courts have recognized the lawfulness of zoning regulations about
as rapidly as organized communities have found them necessary,5 3
so long as they were not unreasonable or arbitrary.54 The above
statements should be considered in light of the fact that the
validity of specific provisions in zoning ordinances is tested only
as cases arise in which they are directly involved and in which
a decision on the question of validity is necessary.5 There is a
presumption that zoning ordinances are proper exercises of the
police power, so that the one attacking the ordinance has the
burden of showing that it rests upon no reasonable basis.0 In
addition, courts are reluctant to interfere with the zoning authori-
ties by substituting their own judgment for that of the zoners.5 7
46. 4 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, State and
Local Government in New York (1938) 355.
47. 8 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, Problems
Relating to Executive, Administration and Powers (1938) 318.
48. Baker, Legal Aspects of Zoning (1927) 113; Metzenbaum, The Law
of Zoning (1930) 18.
49. Cass County v. Jack (1872) 49 Mo. 196; Ex parte Roberts (1901)
166 Mo. 207, 65 S. W. 726; Ex parte Berger (1906) 193 Mo. 16, 90 S. W.
759; State v. Missouri Pac. Ry. (1912) 242 Mo. 339, 147 S. W. 118. Mo.
Const. (1875) art. II, §2 provides "That the people of this State have the
inherent, sole and exclusive right to regulate the internal government and
police thereof, * * * "
50. Ex parte Lerner (1920) 281 Mo. 18, 218 S. W. 331; Kansas City v.
Case Threshing Mach. Co. (1935) 337 Mo. 913, 87 S. W. (2d) 195; Ex
parte Williams (1940) 345 Mo. 1121, 139 S. W. (2d) 485.
51. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. People of the State of Illinois (1906) 200
U. S. 561.
52. Bacon v. Walker (1907) 204 U. S. 311.
53. Noble State Bank v. Haskell (1911) 219 U. S. 104; Max Factor &
Co. v. Kunsman (1936) 5 Cal. (2d) 446, 55 P. (2d) 177; Wertheimer, Con-
stitutionality of Rural Zoning (1938) 26 Cal. L. Rev. 175.
54. Bassett, Zoning (1936) 17.
55. State ex rel. Vogt v. Reynolds (1922) 295 Mo. 375, 244 S. W. 929;
Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City (1929) 13 S. W. (2d) 628.
56. State ex rel. Helseth v. DuBose (1930) 99 Fla. 812; City of Jackson
v. McPherson (1932) 162 Miss. 164, 138 So. 604.
57. American Wood Products Co. v. City of Minneapolis (1929) 35 F.




A liberal and expanding attitude in the courts in indicated, and
must be considered in predicting validity of zoning without
further constitutional changes. This attitude is further verified
by considering the validity of ordinances passed with aesthetic
purposes as their primary basis, and though most courts aver
that zoning cannot be upheld upon this basis alone,58 yet many
of the same courts have given extremely broad definitions of the
police power to uphold them,59 and a few by dicta say that
aesthetic purposes alone are sufficient to justify the use of the
police power for zoning.60
In view of this liberality, it becomes increasingly difficult to
predict with any degree of certainty just what direction the
courts will take when confronted with a specific zoning problem,
for even when constitutions have provided for zoning in certain
instances the courts have been known to permit zoning in situa-
tions not mentioned in the constitutions,81 indicating that zoning
is exercised under the police power rather than under constitu-
tional provision.62 But it has been suggested that certain repre-
hensible practices should be curtailed by constitutional safeguard,
for example, the practice of "spot zoning" 63 which has been al-
most universally criticized." Though "spot zoning" has been held
58. Nectow v. City of Cambridge (1928) 277 U. S. 183; Mueller v. Hoff-
meister Undertaking and Livery Co. (1938) 343 Mo. 430, 121 S. W. (2d)
775; Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, Missouri
(C. C. A. 8, 1932) 58 F. (2d) 593.
59. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926) 272 U. S. 365; Nectow
v. City of Cambridge (1928) 277 U. S. 183; Women's Kansas City St.
Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, Mo. (C. C. A. 8, 1932) 58 F. (2d) 593.
60. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works
(1985) 289 Mass. 149, 193 N. E. 799. Though this case is not a zoning
case, the opinion may be said to advance aesthetic considerations by its
analysis. Ware v. City of Wichita (1923) 113 Kans. 153, 214 Pac. 99.
Tilton, Regulating Land Uses in the County (May, 1931) 155-Part II
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 123,
138 says: "The courts recognize an aesthetic basis, but for security they
seek arguments related to health or safety upon which to justify approval
of such legislation."
61. State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans (1923) 154 La. 271, 97 So.
440; State v. Houghton (1920) 144 Minn. 1, 14, 176 N. W. 159; State ex
rel. Carter v. Harper (1923) 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451.
62. Building Inspector of Lowell v. Stoldosa (1924) 250 Mass. 52, 145
N. E. 262; Spector v. Building Inspector of Milton (1924) 250 Mass. 63,
145 N. E. 265; Brett v. Building Commissioner of Brookline (1924) 250
Mass. 73, 145 N. E. 269; Wood v. Building Commissioner of City of Boston
(1926) 256 Mass. 238, 152 N. E. 63. Mass. Const. (1922) art. LX pro-
vides for zoning of buildings, making no mention of land, yet land is
regulated much the same as in states having no constitutional amendment
for zoning.
63. Bassett, Zoning (1936) 17.
64. "Spot zoning" is the arbitrary devotion of small areas within a dis-
trict to a use which is inconsistent with the use to which the district is
19421
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invalid" in Missouri, yet an ounce of prevention might be worth
a pound of cure. And to obviate the chance of any question under
the state constitution, provision might well be made allowing
the state to zone the land "use" and provide the measure of con-
•trol which the state may exercise over it."
It is submitted, however, that in the constitutional revision
too much should not be provided in relation to zoning practices,
for zoning has just been born into a rapidly changing world and
to hedge it in with too stringent limitations, or those that may
in the future become so, could gravely hinder its growth toward
the public good.
R. J. W.
THE PROBLEM OF EXCESS CONDEMNATION
Excess condemnation is a subject which has been widely dis-
cussed' and greatly controverted. Under the present Missouri
constitutional provision,2 which is representative of the majority
of states, property may be taken only when it is reasonably neces-
sary to the specific purpose of the public improvement for which
the condemnation was instituted, and when the improvement
could not be accomplished without the use of such property.3
Excess condemnation would give the state or municipal govern-
ment the authority to condemn in excess of property directly
xestricted; but a use which is different without being inconsistent is not
"spot zoning." Higbee v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. (1940) 235 Wis. 91, 292
N. W. 320.
65. Munro, A Danger Spot in the Zoning Movement (May 1931) 155-
Part II The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ence 202, 205: "The practice of spot zoning has been responsible for much
chicanery and political favoritism at the city hall. Small parcels of land,
sometimes single lots, are lifted bodily out of one zone and placed in an-
other, while all the surrounding land remains as before. * * * There is
need for a halt in the freehanded practice of spot zoning for the benefit
of anyone'who happens to have sufficient influence with the public authori-
ties. The inconsistencies and the palpable inequities which accompany this
practice are fraught with danger to the whole zoning movement" Bassett,
Zoning (1936) 122 and 145.
66. Mueller v. Hoffmeister Undertaking and Livery Co. (1938) 343 Mo.
430, 121 S. W. (2d) 775.
67. 4 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, State and
Local Government in New York (1938) 363.
1. See, e. g., Cushman, Excess Condemnation (1917); 1 Nichols, Eminent
"Domain (2d ed. 1917) 177, §63; Steiner, Excess Condemnation (1938) 3
Mo. L. Rev. 1; Note (1932) 18 Va. L. Rev. 580; Note (1932) 6 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 196.
2. Mo. Const. (1875) art. II, §20.
3. See cases cited note 12, infra.
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